A groundbreaking collection of contemporary essays from leading international scholars that provides a balanced and expert account of the resurgent debate about substance dualism and its physicalist alternatives. Substance dualism has for some time been dismissed as an archaic and defeated position in philosophy of mind, but in recent years, the topic has experienced a resurgence of scholarly interest and has been restored to contemporary prominence by a growing minority of philosophers prepared to interrogate the core principles upon which past (...) objections and misunderstandings rest. As the first book of its kind to bring together a collection of contemporary writing from top proponents and critics in a pro-contra format, The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism captures this ongoing dialogue and sets the stage for rigorous and lively discourse around dualist and physicalist accounts of human persons in philosophy. Chapters explore emergent, Thomistic, Cartesian, and other forms of substance dualism—broadly conceived—in dialogue with leading varieties of physicalism, including animalism, non-reductive physicalism, and constitution theory. Loose, Menuge, and Moreland pair essays from dualist advocates with astute criticism from physicalist opponents and vice versa, highlighting points of contrast for readers in thematic sections while showcasing today’s leading minds engaged in direct debate. Taken together, essays provide nuanced paths of introduction for students, and capture the imagination of professional philosophers looking to expand their understanding of the subject. Skillfully curated and in touch with contemporary science as well as analytic theology, The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism strikes a measured balanced between advocacy and criticism, and is a first-rate resource for researchers, scholars, and students of philosophy, theology, and neuroscience. (shrink)

A naturalistic theory of rationalization is defended against a fundamental objection. The theory claims that: The rationalizing relation can be fully analysed in causal explanatory terms. However, is rendered problematic by the fact that: Rationalizations exhibit a higher degree of intensionality than ordinary physical causal explanations. To show that can be maintained in the face of , I develop an account of on which and may be reconciled. ;The opening chapter gives an account of the intensionality of ordinary physical causal (...) explanations by developing a counterfactual analysis of causal relevance. Chapter II examines the nature and intensionality of rationalizations. It is argued that despite , a rationalization partly involves a causal relevance relation between its explanans and explanandum. ;In Chapter III, I consider an argument which implies that is false: Davidson's argument that there can be no psychophysical laws. An attempt is made to give a clear and compelling representation of this argument. As I interpret it, the argument depends on the alleged insolubility of the problem of causal deviance in action. ;Chapter IV develops a general theory of deviance according to which any functional system may produce output in a deviant way, and applies this theory to agents. A negative consequence of the theory is that an action may be performed in a deviant way even if the agent's intention causally explains the action . A positive consequence of the theory is that an action is performed in a non-deviant way just in case there is an appropriate causal explanation of why the agent's intention causes him to act. My specific suggestion is that an agent performs an action in a non-deviant way when and only when his intention causes him to act because he "knows how" to act in that way. ;In the last chapter, it is argued that our solution to the problem of deviance can be adapted to account for in causal explanatory terms. In this way and are reconciled. (shrink)

Darwinian Evolution and Classical Liberalism brings together a collection of new essays that examine the multifaceted ferment between Darwinian biology and classical liberalism.

John Searle claims that reasoning requires libertarian free will. He hopes this can be reconciled with a naturalistic neuroscience through a sophisticated theory of emergence, which includes indeterminism, and topdown causation. This is allegedly naturalistic because each mental state is causally reducible to a realizing neuronal state. I argue that Searle’s theory fails to overcome four main problems and cannot account for reasoning without implicit appeal to nonnaturalistic entities.

How should we think about the role of visual spatial awareness in perception and perceptual knowledge? A common view, which finds a characteristic expression in Kant but has an intellectual heritage reaching back farther than that, is that an account of spatial awareness is fundamental to a theory of experience because spatiality is the defining characteristic of “outer sense”, of our perceptual awareness of how things are in the parts of the world that surround us. A natural counterpart to this (...) idea is to treat self-consciousness as residing in a kind of sense that is fundamentally “inner”, such as introspection or whatever else gives one privileged access to his own mental states as well as the proprioceptive and kinesthetic awareness of bodily position. This division is compatible, of course, with the idea that inner sense provides an awareness of a distinctive kind of “body space”, but it treats that as importantly different from the awareness of the worldly space around one. -/- In contrast to such a picture, this dissertation proposes an account of visual spatial awareness according to which it is no less a source of self-consciousness than of the awareness of the objects around us, and an account of self-awareness in which visual experience is essentially implicated. I begin by arguing that we should think of visual spatial awareness not as necessary for the individuation of visual sensations but rather as an essential element in the awareness of an experientially objective world. In the subsequent chapters, I argue that in being visually aware of the egocentric positions of the worldly objects around us we are often aware also of our own spatial locations with respect to them, and that the visual experience of the world around one and one’s own situation in it is often an essential component in the knowledge that a human agent will have of his own intentional actions. (shrink)

In No Caption Needed, Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites provide the definitive study of the iconic photograph as a dynamic form of public art. Their critical analyses of nine individual icons explore the photographs themselves and their subsequent circulation through an astonishing array of media, including stamps, posters, billboards, editorial cartoons, TV shows, Web pages, tattoos, and more. Iconic images are revealed as models of visual eloquence, signposts for collective memory, means of persuasion across the political spectrum, (...) and a crucial resource for critical reflection. Arguing against the conventional belief that visual images short-circuit rational deliberation and radical critique, Hariman and Lucaites make a bold case for the value of visual imagery in a liberal-democratic society. No Caption Needed is a compelling demonstration of photojournalism’s vital contribution to public life. (shrink)

Is your mind the same thing as your brain, or are there aspects of mind beyond the brain's biology? This is the mind-body problem, and it has captivated curious minds since the dawn of human contemplation. Today many insist that the mind is completely reducible to the brain. But is that claim justified? In this stimulating anthology, twenty-five philosophers and scientists offer fresh insights into the mind-brain debate, drawing on psychology, neurology, philosophy, computer science, and neurosurgery. Their provocative conclusion? The (...) mind is indeed more than the brain. (shrink)

Substance dualism is compatible not only with Cartesian dualism but also with a number of nonCartesian alternatives, including several varieties of Thomistic dualism, William Hasker's emergent subject dualism, and the holistic anthropology of E. J. Lowe. Due to recent developments within the philosophy of mind, a renewed interest in historical and contemporary theories of the soul, and a more careful evaluation of what does and does not follow from neuroscience, substance dualism is back on the table for a serious critical (...) reevaluation. This chapter reviews the developments in the philosophy of mind and in scholarship on the soul. It shows that substance dualists and their many critics have been brought together by a shared focus on the nature of mental subjects. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. (shrink)

Foundational theories of the public sphere prioritize civic speech while distrusting forms of visuality. As a corrective to this model of the public sphere, rhetorical theorists have recently emphasized visuality as a constitutive mode of contemporary public culture, but they nevertheless tend to prioritize the civic actor over the civic spectator. A productive alternative would begin to distinguish an emerging shift from “deliberative publicity” to “photographic publicity.” The bourgeois public sphere innovated verbal communicative practices that produced a specifically deliberative publicity, (...) enabling one resolution to the core political problems of an earlier era. Likewise, contemporary publics utilize emerging digital technologies to produce a specifically photographic publicity, allowing them to address fundamental limitations of the bourgeois public sphere. Photographic publicity helps us rethink the problem of the public sphere in terms of theatricality and civic spectatorship. (shrink)

A biblical approach to reconciling God’s sovereignty with creaturely responsibility should avoid the extremes of global occasionalism and completely autonomous creatures. This paper evaluates the standard intermediary solutions offered by conservationists and concurrentists. It argues that while each contributes insights which a satisfactory account should retain, none is fully adequate. Even Leibniz’s sophisticated response, which accounts for providence, miracles, and moral responsibility, unacceptably abridges creaturely power to implement decisions. My alternative proposal seeks to explain how creatures can retain full responsibility (...) for their actions even though God reserves the right to override creaturely power with His greater power. (shrink)

According to Christian physicalism (CP), a human person does not have an immaterial soul, but is identical to or constituted by a physical object. This chapter focuses on several reasons to think CP does not adequately account for the stewardship obligations. If CP is properly confined to the resources actually available to a physicalist anthropology it seems unable to account for the capacities of stewards, including a first‐person perspective, knowledge of the natural world, reasoning, and the ability to act. To (...) the extent that CP does seem able to account for these capacities, it relies heavily on a nonexplanatory notion of emergence and apparently nonphysical notions of teleology and life. But on physicalism, concepts emerge as the result of causal interactions with the brain, and this means that those concepts are limited to what can be explained by the individual learning history of a human organism or natural selection operating on the human species. (shrink)

Downward causation (mental to physical causation) is controversial in the philosophy of mind. Some materialists argue that such causation is impossible because it (1) violates the causal closure of the physical; (2) is incompatible with natural law; and (3) cannot be reconciled with the empirical evidence from neuroscience. This paper responds to these objections by arguing that (1) there is no good reason to believe that the physical is causally closed; (2) properly understood, natural laws are compatible with downward causation; (...) and (3) recent findings in neuroscience reported by Schwartz, Beauregard, and others provide strong empirical support for downward causation. (shrink)

Folk psychology affirms the existence of a persistent, unitary self at the center of each individual’s mental life. Darwinian psychologists have challenged this view with the selfish gene and selfish meme theories of the mind. Both theories claim that cognition arises from the interaction of blind, selfish replicators (genes or memes) and that the enduring self is an illusion. I argue that both theories suffer from an implausible atomism and an inability to explain human reasoning, subjectivity, points of view, and (...) psychological unity. By contrast, a psychology premised on Intelligent Design is able to account for all these problems. (shrink)

Routinely dismissed as a defeated position, substance dualism has seen a resurgence. This is partly due to a persistent failure of reductive physicalism to capture mental phenomena and to the instability of nonreductive alternatives. But it is also due to the return of the subject to center stage in the philosophy of mind and to the rich diversity of historical and contemporary theories of the soul. It is therefore time for a serious reevaluation of the merits of substance dualism by (...) both dualists and their physicalist rivals, hence this symposium and the related book, The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. (shrink)

I argue that materialism is unable to account for knowledge deriving from such abstracta as rules of inference, algorithms, and the ideals of infinity, perfection, and eternity. Both reductive and nonreductive materialism subscribe to the causal closure of the physical world, which implies that a creature’s concepts derive exclusively from the interactions of brains with the physical environment. These resources do not explain the acquisition of abstract concepts or the successful use of these concepts in gaining important knowledge about the (...) world. By contrast, if both God and souls exist, we can understand how knowledge based on abstracta is possible. (shrink)

Christian philosophers have engaged naturalism in three main ways: direct refutation; systematic comparison; and sustained development of compelling alternative accounts. While all of these options have value, I argue that it is, and especially, that are most likely to win converts, and that we are witnessing an encouraging strategic shift in that direction. Options and bring Christian philosophers into closer dialogue with their naturalistic counterparts, building mutual respect and a greater opportunity for Christian philosophers to gain a full and fair (...) hearing. This points to a bright future for Christian philosophy. (shrink)

Questions of religious liberty have become flashpoints of controversy in virtually every area of life around the world. Despite protection of religious liberty at both supranational and individual state levels, there is an increasing number of conflicts concerning the proper way to recognize it, both in modern secular states, and in countries with an established religion or theocratic mode of government. This book provides an analysis of the general concept of religious liberty with a close study of important cases that (...) serve as a test bed for proposals. It combines the insights of both pure academics and experienced practitioners in law to take a fresh look at the nature, scope and limits of religious liberty. Divided into two parts, the collection presents a blend of legal and philosophical approaches, and draws on cases from a wide range of jurisdictions, including Brazil, India, Australia, USA, Netherlands, and Canada. Presenting a broad range of views, this often provocative volume makes fascinating reading for academics and researchers working in the areas of law and religion, legal philosophy and human rights. (shrink)

Lynne Rudder Baker maintained that persons are essentially constituted by a first-person perspective. But she argued that this perspective is only an emergent property: it does not require a mental substance. In this paper, I argue that the first-person perspective cannot be a mere mental property, because it presupposes the existence of a mental substance. This makes it incoherent to claim that possession of a first-person perspective is what makes an individual a person. And, intentionality, which is required to have (...) a first-person perspective, also presupposes a mental subject. So the constitution view is not successful in avoiding substance dualism. (shrink)

Many pro-life supporters accept the substance view of human value, tying intrinsic value to properties essential to all human beings. Many pro-choice supporters accept the functionalist view of human value, tying intrinsic value to accidental functional properties. They argue that there are circumstances in which terminating human beings is permissible. I offer three reasons for rejecting FV. First, FV fails to ontologically ground intrinsic qualities. Second, FV entails that technologically enhanced human beings may have greater intrinsic value than unenhanced human (...) beings. Third, FV entails a problematic pragmatic-utilitarian view of value that undermines widespread convictions about human dignity. (shrink)

The ontological argument from reason aims to show that deliberative reasoning cannot be located in a naturalistic ontology, because such reasoning requires a unified, enduring self with libertarian free will. The most popular way of avoiding this argument is to claim that some version of naturalistic compatibilism suffices for human reason, because even in a world of event causation, some creatures may be responsive to reason. In this paper, I argue that the best versions of this approach either smuggle in (...) nonnaturalistic commitments or else cannot distinguish between compulsive rationality merely occurring in someone’s brain from reasoning an agent does. (shrink)

In the movie Contact, an astronomer played by Jodie Foster discovers a radio signal with a discernable pattern, a sequence representing prime numbers from 2 to 101. Because the pattern is too specifically arranged to be mere random space noise, the scientists infer from this data that an extraterrestrial intelligence has transmitted this signal on purpose.

The design inference uncovers intelligent causes by isolating the key trademark of intelligent causes: specified events of small probability. Just about anything that happens is highly improbable, but when a highly improbable event is also specified (i.e., conforms to an independently given pattern) undirected natural causes lose their explanatory power. Design inferences can be found in a range of scientific pursuits from forensic science to research into the origins of life to the search for extraterrestrial intelligence.